Monetary Policy Cooperation to Support Asian Economic Integration by Chow, Hwee Kwan et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
3-2010
Monetary Policy Cooperation to Support Asian
Economic Integration
Hwee Kwan Chow
Singapore Management University, hkchow@smu.edu.sg
Peter Nicholas KRIZ
Singapore Management University, peterkriz@smu.edu.sg
Roberto S. Mariano
Singapore Management University, rsmariano@smu.edu.sg
Augustine H. H. TAN
Singapore Management University, ahhtan@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217590810003626
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Economic Policy Commons, and the Finance Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Chow, Hwee Kwan; KRIZ, Peter Nicholas; Mariano, Roberto S.; and TAN, Augustine H. H.. Monetary Policy Cooperation to Support
Asian Economic Integration. (2010). Singapore Economic Review. 55, (1), 83-101. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1274
MONETARY POLICY COOPERATION TO SUPPORT
ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
HWEE KWAN CHOW*, PETER NICHOLAS KRIZ,
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School of Economics Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903
*hkchow@smu.edu.sg
This paper considers the form of monetary policy coordination and regional exchange rate
arrangement that would best support economic and financial integration in East Asia. In view of the
region’s economic diversity, we propose a graduated program of informal policy cooperation from
weak forms of cooperation to more intensive modes of cooperation such as the adoption of common
monetary policy objectives. An array of informal monetary arrangements rooted to the degree of
institutional development can improve the effectiveness of both sovereign and regional institutions,
and promote integration in East Asia. Drawing upon the European experience with the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM), we conclude that East Asia should first embark on other forms of inte-
gration to aid in the development of a high degree of real and nominal convergence amongst the
regional countries. Only then would an ERM-type system that employs a regional monetary unit
become more sustainable and less susceptible to speculative currency attacks in the region.
Keywords: Regional Economic Integration; Monetary Policy Cooperation; Exchange Rate
Arrangements, Sequencing.
JEL Classification: E58, F31, F33
1. Introduction
The East Asian economies have become more interdependent over time with rising trade
and investment within the region. In particular, the establishment of cross-border pro-
duction networks by transnational corporations since the early 1990s has given rise to the
growing intensity in vertical intra-industry trade among the East Asian countries. More
recently, the liberalization of China’s economy has also led to an increasing bias towards
intra-Asian trade and investment. Indeed, intra-regional trade as a share of total trade of the
East Asian countries namely, the 10 ASEAN member countries, China, Hong Kong, Japan,
Korea and Taiwan exceeded 50% in 2005.1 Nevertheless, regional trade integration did not
come at the expense of trade with the rest of the world, as evidenced by the growth of extra-
regional trade as a share of GDP in the East Asian countries. Meanwhile, about one-third
of all FDI inflows to the region are between Asian countries (Hattari and Rajan, 2008).
*Corresponding Author.
1Data source is Asian Development Bank’s Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC) Integration Indicators Database.
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Further, there has been a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements focused on
lowering barriers to trade and investment within East Asia.2
Turning to finance, the 1997–98 Asian crisis provided the impetus for regional financial
cooperation. The first annual meeting of the finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries—
that comprises the 10 ASEAN countries, and China, Japan and Korea — in 2000 saw the
development of a system of bilateral credit arrangements known as the Chiang Mai Initiative
(CMI) which is aimed at helping regional countries experiencing balance of payment diffi-
culties. Since then, the size of these bilateral swap agreements have been enlarged and con-
siderations made of setting up a self-managed reserve pooling arrangement governed by a
single contractual agreement as a form of multilateralization. As for initiatives to integrate
regional financial markets, the Executives’ meeting of East Asia and Pacific central banks
(EMEAP) sponsored the establishment of two Asian bond funds in 2003 and 2004 respect-
ively. The first is to purchase US dollar-denominated bonds issued by the Asian government,
while the second is to invest in local currency bonds.More recently, the focus have been on the
exploration new debt instruments for infrastructure financing, promotion of securitization of
loan credits and receivables and the promotion of Asian Medium Term Note (MTN) pro-
gramme.Akeymotivation to enhance financial integration in the region is to facilitate themore
efficient use of Asian surplus savings via greater regional financial intermediation between
savers and investors, in place of intermediation through financial markets outside Asia.
These developments have led some to consider how the authorities in the East Asian
countries could engineer monetary policy cooperation to advance economic and financial
integration that fosters macroeconomic and financial stability in the region. In this
paper, we address two important policy questions related to prospective East Asian
monetary policy cooperation. One policy question pertains to the search for deeper monetary
cooperation and is motivated by whether the European experience, whereby monetary
integration spurred intra-regional trade, investment and financial flows, is relevant to East
Asia.3 Therefore, we ask the following question: Should East Asia push for an Asian-
flavoured version of the EuropeanMonetary System (EMS) cumExchange RateMechanism
(ERM)? To this question, we argue that the lack of strong supranational institutions in East
Asia suggests that the formal monetary coordination that reflected Europe’s march from the
EMS to the Euro be eschewed in favor of looser forms of monetary cooperation.
The second policy question pertains to the broader economic implications of monetary
cooperation. We are motivated by theoretical and empirical evidence that economic activity
endogenises and organizes around the behavior of the monetary regime in place. Therefore,
we ask the following question: What regional exchange rate arrangement, if any, could best
support the economic integration process in East Asia? While the experience of North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) demonstrates that fluctuations in exchange rates are
not incompatible with a free trade area, we argue that stability in currency relationships do
become more advantageous with greater levels of integration.4 The renewed focus on
2See ARIC’s FTA database for Asia for a comprehensive list of such agreements.
3There is, of course, a mutually reinforcing relationship between monetary integration and real integration.
4 In view of the high degree of openness of the Asian countries and their dependence on exports and FDI, a key objective to
avoid excessive volatility and misalignment of the currencies is to maintain competitiveness.
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closer integration in East Asia thus calls for regional monetary cooperation and a common
understanding with regard to exchange rates, their movement, their channels, and their
sovereign and regional implications. Drawing upon the European experience with the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), we conclude that East Asia should, for the moment,
eschew formal exchange rate arrangements until East Asia has achieved a high degree of
real and nominal convergence.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. The next section proposes a nested
sequential program of informal monetary policy cooperation among East Asian countries.
The applicability of the European ERM to this region is discussed in Sec. 3, while the
prerequisites for formal regional monetary policy coordination are found in Sec 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Phasing Informal Monetary Policy Cooperation
The nature of regional economic and financial integration in East Asia and the continuing
globalization of markets each suggest that informal monetary policy cooperation can play a
significant role as either a stand alone policy pathway or as a stepping stone to formal
monetary coordination.5 While formal monetary coordination presents all kinds of econ-
omic, political and institutional challenges that can derail the move toward an Asian
monetary system and call into question its superiority over sovereign approaches to
monetary policy, informal cooperation has the ability to enhance both sovereign monetary
policy and prospects for formal monetary coordination. To illustrate this twin potential, we
propose a nested sequential program of informal monetary policy cooperation among East
Asian countries. Our proposed program can be divided into three phases, covering (i)
existing regimes; (ii) common objective variables; and (iii) common regimes. Each phase is
informal in the sense that neither formal contractual commitment nor political accom-
modation is mandated. Rather, each phase is market-driven and structurally-driven and
serves to facilitate regional economic and financial integration despite being wholly
sovereign in nature.
2.1. Phase I: Informal cooperation using existing policy regimes
The simplest mode of monetary policy cooperation would be for East Asian countries to
pursue non-monetary policy cooperation using their existing policy regimes. Phase I would
include technical assistance, human capital training programs, and the increased availability
of economic and financial information. Such cooperation will undoubtedly strengthen risk
management and prudential supervision within the country. The need for regional surveil-
lance, as underscored by the Asian crisis, has led to the establishment of the ASEANþ3
Economic and Policy Review and Dialogue (ERPD) Process for the purpose of peer review
and policy dialogue amongst the finance ministers of the region.6 However, the principle
5Even if a formal approach is adopted, in practice, preconditions would need to be spelled out and a time-line for individual
countries to meet these pre-conditions would need to be defined before the region is ready for integration. Essentially, this
paper attempts to articulate the steps to achieve convergence in terms of monetary objectives and regimes.
6EMEAP has also been very active in regional surveillance and financial cooperation.
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of non-intervention in other countries’ affairs (in order to avoid conflict) could hamper
candid dialogue, bringing into question the effectiveness of the process in identifying
incipient risks (Wang and Woo, 2004). In order for regional surveillance to lead to sound
policy-making in the region, standardized data that serve to uncover potential problems
should be provided by the regional authorities in a timely manner. Looking to the process
adopted by the European Union, the analyses and recommendations of a regional insti-
tution or individual countries’ staff members can provide the focus for debate (Kenen and
Meade, 2008). As explained in Kawai and Houser (2007), the EPRD process could be
enhanced from information sharing, to peer review and peer pressure, and then to due
diligence.
Further, Phase I cooperation can promote capital market integration within East Asia
though financial institutional reforms that reduce costs of impediments to cross-border
transactions and improve the harmonization of regional standards and regulations. An
integral component of informal monetary policy cooperation is the implementation of
sovereign institutional reforms and the creation of new regional institutions. Whilst many
Asian countries have pushed forward with financial liberalization, many controls and
restrictions remain in place at the domestic level for some countries that have hampered the
development of legal, accounting, supervisory, and regulatory mechanisms essential to
regional financial stability. To achieve such fundamental reform at the domestic level, the
external pressure of regional financial cooperation should complement internally-driven
financial reform initiatives. In this regard, a forum vested with the necessary authority
could be created to take on the task of promoting and overseeing financial sector reform in
Asia.7 Such a forum could serve as a precursor to an independent, supranational institution
with regulatory and supervisory oversight. The Asian Financial Institute proposed by
Eichengreen (2002) provide an example of such an institution which can better handle
more delicate and politically-charged items on behalf of the region.
Additionally, emergency crisis management mechanisms designed through an explicit
regional institution can implement procedures to slow the spread of any potential financial
contagion that might arise. In fact, even the simplest mode of informal monetary policy
cooperation can help develop “financial circuit breakers” which can give policymakers the
time to locate the specific cause of a given crisis and the opportunity to find an appropriate
resolution. For instance, the ASEANþ3 finance ministers initiated a project on monitoring
capital flows and an early warning system. A prototype version of the Vulnerability
Indicators and Early Warning System software at the Asian Development Bank has been
devised to signal future potential crises, which could potentially aid in limiting the sort of
cross-country contagion experienced during the Asian crisis.
While central banks in East Asia optimize their own sovereign monetary policy regimes,
intensive non-monetary policy cooperation will offer countries a great opportunity to learn
about the subtleties of monetary policy cooperation. Clearly, formal arrangements are
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions in the creation of an esprit de corps among
7Such a forum already exists within ASEAN.
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regional policymakers. Informal yet vigorous cooperation can go a long way in improving
sovereign and regional institutions.
2.2. Phase II: Informal cooperation using common policy objectives
Pushing beyond policy cooperation in Phase I, informal monetary policy cooperation
should deepen in order to move Asia towards recognition of a common set of objective
variables and approaches to identifying those variables. Phase II essentially implies that
regional central bankers adopt a common conceptual framework. National central banks
would still retain discretion over regime choice. However, common objectives will help pin
down expectations in the region and are compatible with deepening integration of financial
markets in the region (Genberg, 2006).
The vast monetary policy literature that has developed over the years points to four
primary stabilization objectives of monetary policy: inflation, employment/output,
exchange rate and interest rate, the latter two of which can also be considered forms of
financial stability.8 These stabilization objectives come directly from a welfare-theoretic
understanding of the social loss function that began in earnest with the publication of
Woodford (1999). While ad hoc loss functions had been around for some time, it was
Woodford’s work9 which signaled a new approach to monetary policy research. His results
confirmed a long-held rule of thumb that central banks should be concerned with the
stabilization of a weighted average of the variance of inflation around its target and the
variance of long-run real marginal costs. Subsequent research extends the central bank loss
function to include two other objectives. Woodford (2003) himself suggests arguments
based on financial market stabilization for why one might wish to stabilize the variance of
the instrument itself.10 While theoretical support for interest rate stabilization is weak,
empirical observations suggest that central banks do move quite cautiously in a stated effort
not to upset financial markets. Or, as evidenced by Fed actions in 2008, further obser-
vations suggest that central banks will intervene into financial markets should the integrity
of those markets be perceived to be at risk.
Moving to the open economy, research on welfare-theoretic models based on the
possibility of imperfect pass-through lend credence to efforts to stabilize in part fluctu-
ations in the exchange rate see (Batini et al., 2001; Monacelli, 2003), and (Devereux and
Engel, 2003) among others. In the case of emerging markets, the presence of original sin11
and possibility of currency and/or maturity mismatches, suggest that exchange rate
stabilization can also serve as de facto financial stabilization.
8We acknowledge that there may be intrinsic conflict between the pursuit of these various objectives, given the limited set of
policy instruments. However, this does not mean the central banks should not monitor different indicators.
9 In a simple closed-economy, dynamic general-equilibrium New Keynesian model, Woodford used a linear approximation to
the utility function of the representative agent to derive an exact representation of the social welfare loss function.
10 Interestingly enough, the sub-prime crisis in the United States in 2007–2008 and the dramatic and controversial inter-
vention by the Federal Reserve has ignited a debate among academicians as to the risks and opportunities presented to central
banks should they take on the additional burden of financial stability.
11The financial and currency crises that have occurred with such regularity and impunity for some emerging market
economies with weak financial systems and regulatory institutions, institutionalized a lack of credibility that taint the
countries with what Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) have termed “original sin”.
Monetary Policy Cooperation to Support Asian Economic Integration 87
While more appealing theoretically, communicating complex operations with multiple
stabilization objectives do have implicit costs to central banks who seek to manage private
sector expectations. Nevertheless, we review these four objectives and discuss their pursuit
within the context of informal monetary policy cooperation. The first objective and most
often mandated in the charters of central banks, is the pursuit of price stability. In support
of this perspective, most modern New Keynesian policy models feature an overwhelming
weight on price stability in the social welfare loss function (Woodford, 2003). The reason
for this is, inflation remains the single biggest threat to social welfare in most macro-
economic models.
The second objective most commonly voiced involves stabilizing some measure of the
real sector. Although its theoretical underpinnings are in terms of real marginal costs,
stabilization of the real sector is usually stated in terms of the output gap (i.e. deviation of
output from potential), the deviation of employment from its natural rate, or deviation of
capacity from potential. Theoretical models tend to give this real objective far less weight
than price stability. Early work assumed relative weighting of inflation and output
objectives according to ad hoc determinations of revealed preference. For example, Galí
and Monacelli (2005) found using a open-economy model that the weight on inflation
stabilization is 43 times that of output gap stabilization! Regardless of these findings,
political-economic arguments suggest that real side objectives can be quite important,
economically as well as politically, particularly in countries where wage and price rigidities
or other frictions are prevalent.
The third objective is less well understood theoretically but of great importance to many
central bankers: financial stability. While curiously missing from many modern monetary
models, explicit interest-stability objectives were at the heart of Alan Greenspan’s risk
management approach to monetary policy (Greenspan, 2005). The risk management
approach to monetary policy argues that monetary policy management should concern
itself not just with average outcomes, but with low probability outcomes. Furthermore,
where possible, the Federal Reserve should move to actively neutralize threats from low
probability outcomes. The risk management approach to monetary policy suggests that the
manner in which central banks adjust their interest rates should take into account its impact
on financial stability.
The fourth objective is also considered controversial: exchange rate stability. There is an
open debate as to whether exchange rates should be stabilized directly. Since the effects of
international price changes operate through CPI inflation, the reason behind placing
additional weight on exchange rate stabilization must exist through other channels. The
debate tends to break down in two separate discussions. For developed economies, the
theoretical and empirical evidence seems weak. Most early research on welfare-theoretic
monetary models have focused on the US and Europe, relatively self-contained economies
with their long histories of financial market development. For these economies, empirically-
calibrated models set optimal weights on the exchange rate, nominal or real, close to zero.
These structurally-dependent findings suggest that dampening exchange rate fluctuations do
not help or may even hurt welfare calculations.
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When instead the focus shifts to emerging markets, the arguments for preventing large
swings in the exchange rates have far more support among both economists and policy-
makers. This support is predicated on the existence of some combination of structural and
institutional realities that give economic rationale for efforts to stabilise exchange rates.
Such realities include currency and maturity mismatches, extreme openness to trade and
export orientation, and weak banking systems vulnerable to capital flow reversals.12 The
theoretical bases for these realities tend to lag the standard models that have dominated the
early contributions to this literature, thus producing a bias in the literature against explicit
weighting of exchange rate stabilization objectives. However, with further advances in the
welfare-theoretic framework, we are starting to see more research giving economic
rationale for exchange rate stabilization.13
In terms of practical policy, Taylor (2000) is among those who has long thought it
prudent that the exchange rate receive non-trivial weight in the central bankers’ loss
function. Anecdotal evidence from the financial and currency crises in Asia and Latin
America demonstrate that policymakers had grave concerns over how exchange rate
fluctuations would affect net asset positions on the balance sheets of financial inter-
mediaries and corporations. Clearly, the risks on corporate balance sheets in Indonesia in
1997–98 suggest that all prices that affect asset positions should be a cause for concern. In
particular, the exchange rate plays an important role in emerging markets due to the fact
that most debt in emerging markets is denominated in foreign–currency and that financial
intermediaries and corporations alike face currencies mismatches on their balance sheets.
Modern monetary models which have begun to incorporate institutional features endemic
to emerging markets would likely reduce the disconnect between the views of academi-
cians and policymakers on stabilizing the exchange rate. While trivial or redundant in
developed economies, they are of critical importance in emerging markets whose domestic
financial sectors are still developing and whose legal, financial, and regulatory institutions
are undergoing fundamental transformation.
Given the great range of institutional development in Asia, allowing economies at
similar stages of economic and institutional development to find commonality first is
preferred to the premature adoption of common objectives throughout the region. For a
region which remains tied to the semantics of Bretton Woods, implementation of a com-
mon set of objective variables for monetary policy will require some effort. However,
informal monetary policy cooperation can help sovereign policymakers craft a region-wide
mandate that encourages central banks to pursue the same four objectives, albeit with
considerably different emphasis given institutional and structural reasons. Such a mandate
that might also specify metrics, intermediate targets, and country-specific tolerances
should, of course, be voluntary and designed to be country-specific.
With the move toward inflation targeting regimes underway in a number of Asian
countries, one can argue that this process is well underway and that regional policy
12Third currency effect and competitive devaluations are also practical problems arising from intra-blco exchange rate
volatility.
13See, for example, Preston and Justiniano (2008) who base arguments for exchange rate stabilization on risk premia that are
pinned down by foreign currency debt levels.
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cooperation can use these institutional changes to advance closer ties with respect to
monetary policy. With common objectives and a single conceptual framework for mon-
etary policy, Asia, as a whole, will be able to accelerate key elements of regional inte-
gration. These would include the development of regional institutions, harmonization of
standards, regional surveillance, adjustment protocol and mechanisms, and crisis man-
agement techniques. Each will provide added support to financial integration. Finally,
successful adoption of a consistent set of policy objectives will prepare the region for
deeper modes of monetary policy cooperation.
2.3. Phase III: Informal cooperation using common policy regimes
Following successful implementation of Phase II, regional policymakers have an oppor-
tunity to further accelerate regionalism through the adoption of common policy regimes
throughout the region. The theoretical literature has been fairly consistent on the benefits of
this deeper mode of informal monetary policy cooperation. Benigno and Benigno (2003)
showed in a two-country model that the use of inflation targeting in both countries can
achieve the same beneficial welfare effects as formal policy coordination. Rose (2007)
echoed these results and argued that common adoption of inflation targeting provides the
region-wide nominal anchor most commonly associated with nominal exchange rates.
The policy cooperation that would lead to a common monetary framework for East Asia
will require some degree of negotiation and persuasion. Nonetheless, once East Asia has
reached the stage in its sovereign and regional fundamentals at which it is ready to adopt a
common policy regime, there are two likely alternatives. The first and most obvious is the
Basket-Band-Crawl (BBC) regime promoted by Williamson (1999, 2001). Given regional
traditions that have emphasized prominence of exchange rate management, the common
adoption of a BBC framework would appear to be a natural candidate. The second
alternative is one that has become increasingly popular even among emerging markets:
inflation targeting.14 Although more difficult institutionally to adopt than BBC regimes,
inflation targeting offers institutional features that will become increasingly attractive as
East Asia continues to deepen her capital markets, develop her social and political insti-
tutions, and establish more credible policy institutions.
Perhaps the most commonly referenced suggestion for a common monetary policy
regime in East Asia is a BBC system with country-specific baskets see (Williamson,
1999, 2001). A BBC regime has three primary components. The basket is the central parity
around which exchange rate movements are compared. For country-specific baskets,
each country’s currency is related to its own weighted basket of currencies of its major
trading partners.15 Compared to a single currency peg, using a currency basket lowers the
14Williamson (1999) noted that a country’s adoption of a BBC exchange rate regime does not preclude it from simul-
taneously operating an inflation targeting monetary regime. Indeed, Ogawa et al. (2004) discussed the various types of
shocks which would illicit compatible responses from both regimes. Further, the use of bands around both inflation and
exchange rate targets allows room for policy to maneuver (Ito and Hayashi, 2004).
15Optimal trade weights are derived by minimizing a loss function which in turn depends on the definition of optimality,
such as the stabilizing domestic output or minimizing the variability of trade balance (Yoshino et al., 2002).
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variability in the real effective exchange rate which confers greater stability to trade
competitiveness.16 The band is the amount of tolerance around the basket within which the
domestic currency is allowed to float. The crawl refers to periodic adjustments in small
steps in the central parity to keep in line with changes in productivity and long-term
fundamentals over time. Adjustments to the crawl help avoid the buildup of a situation
where the domestic currency becomes significantly misaligned. The BBC system can also
be modified to suit the diversity of financial liberalization in East Asia. Changes in the
band, crawl, and basket can each be shaped for a given country.
While attractive, the BBC regime does require credible political commitment from
sovereign authorities. In this regard, it is not total transparency but consistent behavior that
is critical. A case in point is the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Despite not disclosing
the composition of its basket, the MAS enjoys considerable credibility due to its consistent
behavior and excellent performance during the Asian Financial Crisis. Nevertheless, formal
implementation of a BBC potentially invites the prospect of one-sided bets and speculative
attacks. Policymakers can protect their domestic currencies against speculative pressures
by building in such features into a BBC: eschewing a narrow band, blurring the edges of
bands or not disclosing them at all. Of course, common adoption of a BBC framework
under informal monetary policy cooperation does not bind countries to a particular parity
matrix. However, it would presuppose that dampened exchange rate fluctuations are a
revealed preference.
The alternative to common BBC regimes would be the common adoption of inflation
targeting although these two regimes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Inflation
targeting offers economies with more sound institutions and larger internally-driven
demand a nominal anchor without the need to make exchange rate management de facto
monetary policy. As Rose (2007) points out, common adoption of inflation targeting can
be considered to be an informal substitute for formal monetary coordination. Given the
regional emphasis on market-driven rather than politically-driven integration, the ability to
deliver a nominal anchor within informal monetary policy cooperation makes inflation
targeting particularly attractive. Quite clearly, inflation targeting is the current trend for
open economy monetary regimes. It is widely accepted that inflation targeting would be
ideally suited for countries with a modern research infrastructure, sound legal and political
institutions, and more technically-proficient human capital. However, whether inflation
targeting would be as effective in emerging markets remains an open debate.17
Several authors are quick to point out that efficient and credible operation of inflation
targeting requires that a number of conditions be addressed. These requirements include:
central bank independence, freedom from fiscal dominance, policy transparency, sufficiently
developed financial markets, and a modernized research infrastructure (Mishkin, 2000).
More specifically, Bernanke (2004) argues that a sufficiently sophisticated research staff,
sufficiently sophisticated models and forecasting techniques, and sufficiently fine data are
16Various East Asian countries such as China, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore are known to have ever pegged to or
are currently targeting broad baskets of currencies, not least because of their geographically diversified trade patterns.
17See Amato and Gerlach (2001) for an early review on inflation targeting in emerging markets.
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required to realize the potential stabilization benefits of inflation targeting. However, few
emerging markets, including thosewhich have adopted inflation targeting, meet the majority
of these criteria. Furthermore, the global trend toward lower inflation from 1982–2005 and
the deflationary impact of emerging market integration to the global economy masks to, a
large degree, the extent to which the emerging market monetary policies themselves are
responsible for the signification reduction in inflation in these countries. Nevertheless, it is
clear that inflation targeting in emerging markets has become an institutional goal of sorts,
irrespective of whether preconditions have been strictly satisfied.
It is, of course, difficult to compare the efficacy of both regimes for the purpose of moving
towards a common adoption of monetary policy regime in East Asia. Optimal monetary
policy is endogenous to underlying economic structure and the level of institutional
development (financial, legal, and political). Moreover, it is not inconceivable that a given
developed country could operate just as well under different regimes. The key to settling this
debate should depend on the countries themselves rather than on economic ideology. To a
large degree, the BBC system can be operated to achieve the same objectives as inflation
targeting. For example, Singapore operates its monetary policy in a manner as sort of a
hybrid between the two: using a BBC and inflation targeting. In practice, an adjustable band
is used to track the movement of its instrument, while setting its value in such a way as to
hit intermediate targets, control inflation and achieve non-inflationary growth (Khor
et al., 2004). Likewise, a common adoption of an inflation targeting regime provides a
nominal anchor in a manner similar to that under an exchange-rate based monetary system.
Even though the adoption of inflation targeting regime does not rule not intervention in
the foreign exchange markets, the BBC regime places explicit focus on currency move-
ments. It is easier to communicate the BBC framework to the public, particularly in a
region driven by exports. Private agents understand the exchange rate, widths of the band,
the edges of bands, and shifts in the band. Those same agents are not as clear on the
elements of inflation targeting such as the output gap, weighting matrices, the “natural”
rate of unemployment (related to “potential” output), intermediate targets, and forecasts. A
common BBC regime would also appear to be easier to use for cooperation, owing to its
tangibility, particularly on an informal basis.
Over time, East Asia will begin to wean itself off its reliance on export-driven growth.
Already, increases in intra-Asian demand and investment, rapid development of domestic
financial sectors, and upgrades to research infrastructure are taking place quite dramatically
and leading to an embrace of inflation targeting. Even if East Asia proceeds in Phase III
with the common adoption of BBC regimes, domestic developments suggest that the
region could very rapidly sequence to the common adoption of flexible inflation targeting,
perhaps with an explicit exchange rate directive. In fact, various Asian countries in
the post-crisis period, namely, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand have already
adopted inflation targeting as their monetary policy framework.18 Hence, it is not unrea-
sonable to expect that cooperation might coordinate on both of these regimes, with
inflation targeting for more developed economies and BBC for emerging markets.
18 Ito and Hayashi (2004) gave an assessment of their experience with the inflation targeting regime.
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3. Regional Exchange Rate Policy Coordination19
Despite trade patterns that at times suggested otherwise, post-war monetary policy regimes
in the export-oriented economies of East Asia have consistently placed disproportionate
emphasis on exchange rate stability with the US dollar.20 However, the region’s experience
with rapid nominal appreciation in the early 1990s and the subsequent (although not
consequent) financial currency crisis in 1997–1998, led many Asian policymakers to
reestablish rigidity vis-à-vis the US dollar as central to strategic macroeconomic man-
agement. Therefore, soon after the crisis, regional central banks returned to exchange rate
policies that would not only stimulate exports via outsource manufacturing and export
orientation, but limited bilateral volatility with the US dollar. Deemed “Bretton Woods II”
by many keen observers, most notably Dooley et al. (2003), Asia’s twin pursuit of limiting
nominal appreciation and stabilizing the US dollar rate of their currency resulted in a
period in which the spectacular economic recovery of East Asia was worryingly
accompanied by a massive build-up of USD-denominated reserves, large trade surpluses
with the US, and the effective freezing of intra-Asian investment. Since 2006, we have seen
the end of Bretton Woods II, as East Asian currencies (with the exceptions of the Chinese
yuan and the Hong Kong dollar) have not only appreciated sharply against the USD but
have seen more volatility in their bilateral USD rates.
3.1. Alternative currency baskets
We first note at the outset that studies on the feasibility of a full monetary union in East
Asia have invariably deemed it a distant prospect see (Watanabe and Ogura, 2006) for a
survey. Such a conclusion is not in the least surprising in view of the region’s economic and
institutional diversity, as well as the lack (as of yet) of demonstrable political will to
commit credibly to a pathway leading to Asian monetary union. Therefore, if monetary
union cannot serve as the terminal policy focus, policymakers have no choice but to turn
next to formal monetary coordination. They must examine the merits and limitations of
formal coordination. We first consider whether it would be feasible for East Asia to pursue
formal coordination.
Among the most popular ideas considered for formal Asian monetary coordination is
for participating economies to adopt common BBC regimes that use the same currency
basket, i.e., one with identical weights and component currencies. The latter only requires
the coordination of exchange rates amongst countries that still retain their monetary
sovereignty. On the one hand, using country-specific baskets would seem more suitable
19Historical reflection seems to indicate that East Asia’s economic development and integration have required exchange rate
policies on both sovereign and regional grounds that are evolutionary in nature. As we discuss various dimensions of and
possibilities for regional exchange rate policy coordination, we do so without relinquishing the idea that a strictly sovereign
approach may still remain the best strategy for East Asia.
20McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) have termed this regional emphasis on the US dollar as the “East Asian Dollar Standard.”
In the words of Frankel (p. 26, 2003): “The fact that the (US) dollar had occupied a larger role in their monetary arrangements
than the US played in their economies made an eventual mismatch inevitable.” Many prominent economists, most notably
Takatoshi Ito and Seiji Ogawa, have suggested that trade fundamentals in the 1980s warranted yen-focused exchange rate
policies.
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than a common currency basket for exchange rate management in countries with different
trade patterns (de Brouwer, 2004). On the other, the adoption of a common basket might
help reinforce intra-regional exchange rate stability. Ogawa and Ito (2002) argue that a
coordinated move by the Asian countries to the adoption of a common basket would be
better than a non-cooperative equilibrium with country-specific baskets.
Should the East Asian countries agree to adhere to an identical basket, they would have
the difficult task of agreeing on the weights of the common basket. More fundamentally, a
choice would have to be made between using an external basket containing only extra-
regional currencies and an internal basket that also includes only currencies of the parti-
cipating countries.21 Arguments for an external focus posit that adopting a common
external basket will not only stabilize the regional currencies in terms of the external
reference currencies, but will also confer a degree of stability to the cross rates between the
participating countries as well. Obviously, extra-regional reference countries would not be
required to carry out intervention to sustain the peg. Additionally, Asian countries will
need access to sufficient reference currencies such as the US dollar to meet intervention
obligations. In comparison, adopting an internal basket would mean that participating
countries could either rely on national currencies to honor obligations (provided liquid
foreign exchange markets exist for the Asian currencies) or concerted interventions.
An advantage of using an internal basket over an external one is that it could facilitate
adjustments to global imbalances since the regional currencies could then float jointly
against the external currencies (Ito, 2008). To this end, both a common loose arrangement
such as an EMS-type system see, inter alia, (Wyplosz, 2004) and the creation of an official
basket of Asian currencies referred to as an Asian Currency Unit (ACU) that is analogous
to European Currency Unit (ECU) (Ogawa and Shimizu, 2005) have been considered.
Following (Ogawa and Shimizu, 2005), the proposed ACU follows the construction of the
ECU with the weights of each component currency computed based on the relative size of
the country as measured by average trade volume and GDP at PPP.22 Building on the role
the ECU notionally played in specifying exchange rate targets and divergence indicators in
the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS), the proposal is to
use the ACU as a benchmark for monitoring regional exchange rates. As pointed out by
Park (2008), the ACU would not be useful as a surveillance indicator for benchmarking
regional currencies should there be no agreement on a set of rules governing intragroup
exchange rate adjustments. This leads us to assess the feasibility of implementing an ERM-
type system as a regional exchange rate arrangement in East Asia.
3.2. Is an ERM-type system feasible for East Asia?
Drawing on the European experience,23 what are the chances of success for sustainable and
politically feasible ERM-type system in East Asia? To answer this question, one needs to
21Yet another alternative is to use a currency basket that has both internal and external currencies.
22See REITI website http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/amu/en/index.html for details.
23For a review of the European experience with the ERM, see Buiter et al. (1998); Tietmeyer (1998) and Chow et al. (2008),
amongst others.
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consider both the systemic integrity of the arrangement itself, as well as the context of both
the economic structure and political institutional environment that shapes the applicability
and implementation of such a system. Quite clearly, the region needs the correct array of
features, within some reasonable degree of tolerance, in order to operate a regional
exchange rate arrangement that is both credible and sustainable. First, the exchange rate
system must incorporate flexibility in terms of allowing for adjustments in the reference
rates. Indeed, an important lesson from the European experience is that realignments of the
central rates within the regional exchange rate system are necessary, as pointed out by
Jochimsen (1993): “… during the second half of the 1980s, where one mistook the goal of
keeping exchange rates stable as already constituting the result of actually holding them
stable, without regard to the corresponding exigencies of adjusting domestic fiscal policies
and collective bargaining accordingly.” After all, according to the literature on exit strat-
egies, the credibility of the system should not be undermined by parity changes if they are
undertaken only when the cause can be directly observed or independently verified.
However, the rules of the system have to be well-defined and compromises arising from
conflicting interests of member countries should be ruled out (Volz, 2006).
Second, the incidence of speculative currency assault can be reduced by choosing
sufficiently wide exchange rate bands, such as allowing constituent currencies to fluctuate
within a þ=¡ X% band.24 The idea of a narrow band was to demonstrate to speculators the
seriousness of the commitment. However, narrow bands tend to encourage one way bets by
currency speculators. They also tend to force upon central banks the need to take inter-
marginal interventions more frequently and publicly in the face of various macroeconomic,
financial and political shocks, thus increasing the pressure to remain credibly committed to
the central parity. Conversely, wider fluctuation margins that allow for reversal of exchange
rate movements make currency speculation more risk-prone. Wide bands become more
attractive as monetary coordination moves away from the management of the exchange rate
system as the be-all-end-all goal of the system and towards more broadly defined monetary
policy. Wider bands also present the monetary authorites with more options and more time
to handle unforeseen shocks. Finally, wider bands enable central banks to exploit any value
inherent in a lack of transparency. In a cooperative arrangement, a wide band provides
the impetus for discussion and joint moves. In a true monetary policy system where
exchange rate stability is but one facet, the wide band gives that same impetus of dis-
cussion but without the grave risks of system collapse and the costs of realignment as in the
EMS. However, we note that in a pure exchange rate management system, bands that are
too wide can promote poor discipline and excessive volatility.
What then constitutes the optimal width of a band? Practically speaking, the band
should be wide enough to maximize the benefits of adjustment flexibility, the anchor of
commitment, and the flexibility of policy options given the economic and institutional
realities of the member countries, without the need for frequent intervention or resetting of
the band. Such an approach, determined by a combination of research and political
24We can also consider bands of varying width, narrower ones for the “center” or “core” countries and wider ones for the less
financially developed countries, as discussed in Chow et al. (2006).
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agreement, would improve upon rule-of-thumb guidelines that fixates on a specific
bandwidth independent of the relevant political economy.
Third, support mechanisms such as common support funds for the defense of exchange
rate parities are required to increase the credibility of a regional exchange rate system.
To this end, the enlargement and institutionalization of the CMI swap arrangements as
well as the pooling of the reserves of the East Asian countries have been suggested
(Chaipravat, 2004). While the design of the EMS was to offer unlimited financial support
to the integrity of the system, this cost was too much to bear in the end and the realism over
the non-sustainability of the system prevailed. Despite the availability of huge foreign
reserves in this region, a strong currency country would not have the incentive to support
weak currencies as it risks losses due to the hazardous behavior of weak currency partners
(Volz, 2006). This underlines the need for a regional institution with regulatory and
supervisory oversight. As explained by Eichengreen (2001), a regional analogue to the
International Monetary Fund is needed to monitor policies and push for adjustments. The
absence of such an institution meant that the strong currency countries cannot be assured
that their weak currency counterparts would take policy adjustments. Therefore, the foreign
support they were willing to provide was necessarily limited. There is a need for partici-
pating countries to redirect their sovereign policies to be consistent with the requirements
of the Asian Monetary System. If member countries do not, (a) clean house and, (b)
subjugate their sovereign policies to the regional system, then, as demonstrated by the
EMS, the system will fall apart.25
Fourth, the credibility of an ERM-type system in this region depends critically on the
effective regional cooperation on monetary policy amongst the East Asian countries.
Unlike the adoption of a common external basket which means Asian countries would be
importing to some extent the monetary policies of the reference extra-regional countries,
they would not have an obvious anchor for their monetary policies should they use an
internal basket instead. Although the ERM parity grid system provided a neutral frame-
work for monetary cooperation, it quickly anchored on the German mark which also served
as the indicator variable, rendering only a minor role for the ECU. Similarly, an Asian
monetary system will need some kind of anchor, most likely an anchor currency, to provide
a target for calibrating regional monetary policy. The anchor of the system may mean one
currency, or it can mean some linear combination of several currencies.
Germany became the anchor for Europe for three reasons. One, its economy, the largest
in Europe, was clearly the leading, regional engine for economic growth. Two, the Bun-
desbank was the pillar for credibility monetary policy in Europe, if not the world. Three,
the direction of the German economic and political policies became the foundation for pan-
European vision and development. Presently in East Asia, there is no one country that is
yet playing the role of Germany in regional policy cooperation. Most importantly, Asia
lacks a clear economic vision to anchor its development going forward. If a truly regional
25For this reason, it is vital that regional options represent an attractive alternative to sovereign monetary policy. If the
political-economic calculus is such that sovereign monetary policy remains optimal for a given country, than not only should
entry into a formal system of coordination be considered premature or inappropriate, but any such entry may led to a collapse
for the entire monetary system.
96 The Singapore Economic Review
monetary effort is forthcoming in Asia, it seems essential that China and Japan work
together just as France and Germany wedded their futures together.26
4. Pre-Requisites for Formal Monetary Policy Coordination
Unlike informal monetary policy cooperation, the constraints of formal monetary policy
cooperation presuppose binding obligations. Formal monetary policy coordination only
makes sense if participating countries have the capacity to credibly commit to both the
success of the monetary arrangement and the implicit regional ideals therein. Importantly,
this capacity can be in the form of expectations. The continued fluidity of economic
development in East Asia suggests that as long as private expectations believe in the ability
of political commitment to formal regional monetary coordination, a formal system can
sustain itself. To earn these expectations, regional policymakers must accelerate their own
domestic financial and institutional reforms, deepen regionalism, and ensure fiscal dis-
cipline. Furthermore, regional policymakers must provide demonstrable evidence that
they are serious about the political dimensions of formal coordination. This is particularly
important amongst key countries, whose leadership in formal systems is absolutely
essential. For instance, Bretton Woods broke down precisely because the United States
actively undermined the fiscal discipline necessary for the center country in a center-
periphery system.27 In contrast, Germany successfully anchored the EMS, in part by
massive transfers, even at a time of great fiscal challenges.
Without this capacity for disciplined leadership, participating countries will continue to
place value on the option to exit the arrangement. Without this ability to convince private
expectations, formal monetary arrangements would not advance regional stability beyond
informal cooperation. In fact, attempts to push forward formal coordination prematurely
may end up generating a far more insidious instability than would ever be under a region of
strictly sovereign regimes. A withdrawal from formal coordination would risk the gains
won through informal monetary policy cooperation.
If a regional consensus does develop in such a way to convince private expectations of
the desirability of an East Asian monetary policy, then formal monetary coordination has
the possibility of advancing regional stability beyond informal cooperation. However, the
challenges for formal monetary arrangements in East Asia promise to be considerably more
challenging than the European experience. Wyplosz (2001) identified the lack of regional
institutions as a key factor pointing to the non-viability of a single currency area in East
Asia in the near future.28 Indeed, the economic and political diversity of East Asia will
literally require a set of new regional economic and political institutions. Thus, it remains
imperative that East Asia consider formal monetary coordination with due caution and
26Notwithstanding China’s remarkable economic growth, “the People’s Bank of China is far from being the dominant central
bank in Asia in the way that the Bundesbank was the dominant central bank in the EMS” p. 170, (Kenen and Meade, 2008).
27Similarly, the Gold Standard broke down due to the onset of World War I, when the demands of war financing made fiscal
discipline at the center (and elsewhere) impossible to commit to credibly.
28 In fact, Wyplosz (2001) argues that the necessary political commitment and institution would not be forthcoming unless
governments in the region take the plunge and commit to common arrangements.
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avoid premature actions that eschew the immediate benefits of the phased approach to
informal monetary cooperation. Domestic and regional reforms that offer stabilization and
efficiency benefits regardless of whether formal monetary policy coordination is pursued
would provide invaluable boosts in confidence. It would also solidify private expectations
that formal coordination is political priority.
Note that the above considerations suggest that the adoption of formally coordinated
regional policies, if desired, should proceed gradually. As we have emphasized, economic
theory suggests that while it is a given that optimal monetary policy is endogenous to
economic structure, it is also the case that economic structure itself is endogenous to the
choice of monetary policy regime (Corsetti and Pesenti, 2005). This literature suggests
that, provided there is credible and firm policy commitment, the construction of an Asian
monetary system or monetary union may itself generate the regionalism necessary for its
maintenance. Yet even this perspective requires that Asian political leaders must, at a
minimum, begin to define economic successes along regional lines. The uncertainty
regarding regionalism in Asian policy circles supports arguments in favor of a gradualist
approach to regionalism, such as “learning to coordinate” or “learning to regionalize”. This
approach will leave room for independence toward sovereign objectives until sufficient
consensus and commitment towards regionalism warrants formal coordination.29
5. Conclusion
In order for regional policy coordination to foster macroeconomic and financial stability in
the region, we are of the view that the most effective approach is a nested sequence that
would take East Asia through increasingly intensive informal modes of monetary policy
cooperation. Central to our policy prescription is the remarkable structural and institutional
heterogeneity within the region, an economic landscape that necessarily implies a diversity
of optimal sovereign monetary policy regimes. We suggest that informal modes of
cooperation can be employed to help support the market-based integration that is already
well underway. Only when the East Asian countries could credibly commit to a path of
future monetary union, then should formal monetary arrangements be considered to
advance regional stability. Even if monetary union were deemed undesirable and formal
monetary arrangements then unnecessary, informal monetary policy cooperation should
greatly benefit East Asia. Through its sequencing, informal monetary policy cooperation
can bring about a new era of understanding within the region of the interplay between
policy regimes, agent behavior and spillover. Informal yet vigorous cooperation can go
a long way in improving sovereign and regional institutions and promote regional
integration.
Similarly, the optimal approach to regional exchange rate cooperation should be a
gradual and incremental one, albeit one that recognizes the historical window of oppor-
tunity that Asian diversification now presents to advocates of regionalism. There is a need
29An example of “loose” coordination would be the ERM after the 1992–93 crisis in which exchange rate bands were
widened to þ=¡ 15%. While one can argue that at such tolerances, the economic rationale behind the EMS no longer
applied, the mere existence of the ERM permitted the regional monetary policy dialogue to continue.
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to strike a balance between the conflicting objectives of exchange rate flexibility and
exchange rate stability. The fluidity of the economic environment in East Asia suggests the
former is relatively more important than the latter at the current juncture. Indeed, frequent
adjustments to the ERM-type system arising from variations in the equilibrium exchange
rates due to structural changes will generate a cost in terms of regime credibility.
Embarking on an ERM-type system in the short-term will also constrain the East Asian
countries from having individual country exchange rate responses to asymmetric shocks
that hit the region. Rather, the East Asian countries should initially engage in a less
demanding form of exchange rate cooperation before moving on to restrictive exchange
rate arrangements. Importantly, the regional economies should develop stronger regional
institutions; enhance regional surveillance; strengthen financing facilities under the CMI;
develop well-functioning financial markets and cross-border settlement systems; and
proceed with other forms of regional integration before moving on to formal exchange rate
arrangements. As these other forms of integration aid in the development of a high degree
of real and nominal convergence amongst the East Asian countries, an ERM-type system
would then become more sustainable and less susceptible to speculative currency attack.
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